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being the basis for denying the injured party any recovery a. all. Fourth,
the objection is made that it would be necessary to use a subjective test and
to inquire into the state of mind of the plaintiff. But is not this just what is
being done in defamation cases where express malice has to be discovered in
order to defeat a qualified privilege, or in fraud cases in proving scienter?
Fifth, the most powerful and frequently reiterated argument is that to allow
recovery for mental anguish in an independent action would open a regular
'Tandora's box of evils" inasmuch as there would be a deluge of litigation.
To state this objection is no more than an admission of incapacity on the part
of the courts to dispose of the cases as they arise. There is here an implied
recognition that a wrong has been suffered for which compensation should be
made, but justice is not done merely because of the court's desire to make
their work of administration less difficult.
The very fact that an increasing number of courts and legislatures are
advocating the allowance of damages for mental suffering as an independent
cause of action conclusively shows that the fears of those courts which deny
such damages are not justified. In view of the complexity of modern society
and the development and increased interest of humanity in more refined modes
of living, the boast of the common law that there is a remedy afforded for
every wrong should not be an idle one. Blind and arbitrary adherence to
precedent should not defeat a rule for which both reason and natural justice
are eloquent advocates. 2 1  J. M. C.
PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS-SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM-Action
by the successor of a reorganized bank upon a note executed by defendant
corporation. Defendant claims the right to set off against its obligation a
deposit credit maintained in the defunct bank by a subsidiary corporation.
The subsidiary had established the account by resolution of its own board of
directors, and withdrawal powers were confined to five officers of the sub-
sidiary. However, the same five individuals were the controlling officers of
the parent corporation. Moreover, the bank was frequently given reports of
financial condition by the parent corporation, and in these reports the sub-
sidiary was regarded as a mere division. Practically the management was
the same, but the formalities of separate management were observed. Held,
defendant is not entitled to set off the deposit credit of its subsidiary against
its own indebtedness. 1
The relationship between parent and subsidiary corporations causes con-
siderable difficulty in the law. 2 Although for most purposes the two corpora-
21 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Burton (Ind. App., 1938), 12 N. E. (2nd) 360-
decided subsequently to the instant case allowed recovery for mental anguish
alone, resulting from the defendant's wilfully making an unauthorized autopsy
of the body of plaintiff's husband. The language used by the court is suf-
ficiently broad to be in conflict with the decision in the principal case-
"Mental suffering need not be accompanied by physical injury where the act
. resulted in the invasion of the legal rights of another." However,
this is mere dictum because recovery was granted on the grounds pointed
out above-Note 8.
1 Feucht v. Real Silk Hosiery Mills (Ind. App. 1938), 12 N. E. (2d) 1019.
2For discussion of the general problem, see: Powell, Parent and Sub-
sidiary Corporations (1931); Douglas and Shanks, Insulation from Liability
RECENT CASE NOTES
tions will be regarded as separate entities with no relation other than that of
stockholder and corporation, there are occasions when the courts will recognize
a closer relationship. This may be done by treating them as principal and
agent, or by "disregarding the corporate fiction" 3 and treating the two cor-
porations as substantially identical. Mere stock ownership will not produce
this result; numerous factors including extent of ownership, observation of
formalities of separate management, separate financial units, holding out to
the public as unified, and solvency of the subsidiary will be considered. 4 The
sum and substance of the inquiry is whether the dual organization is used to
gain legitimate advantages of the separate entity privilege conferred upon
incorporators, or whether the subsidiary entity is being used as a subversive
device to gain unfair advantages over those with whom they deal.
A situation that has arisen in several recent cases is the right to use claims
of one corporation as equitable setoffs against liabilities of the others, espe-
cially in connection with insolvent banks. It is held by the overwhelming
weight of authority that a deposit credit may be set off against a liability of
the depositor to a bank; and such a setoff does not constitute an unlawful
preference of creditors where the bank is insolvent.5 With the flood of bank
failures in the period from 1929-1933 came frantic attempts by depositors to
realize on the value of their deposits by setoffs against indebtedness. The
efforts have not been confined to personal indebtedness, but attempts have
extended to partnership indebtedness, representative indebtedness, corporate
indebtedness, and the like. And conversely, partnership deposits, representative
deposits, and corporate deposits have been claimed as setoffs against individual
indebtedness.
It is often stated as a general rule that setoffs will be allowed only where
there is a mutuality of claims. That is, a person can set off against his own
obligations only claims which he has against the same person asserting the
claim against him. The parties to the two obligations must be identical. How-
ever, many courts, including Indiana, will recognize an equitable right to a
setoff without mutuality if recognition of the right is necessary to effect a
clear equity.6 The application of this principle to the parent and subsidiary
muddle is the problem raised in the present case.
Where a subsidiary is so dominated by the parent that the bank could
hold the assets of one liable for the obligations of the other, the rule of
Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 Yale L. J. 193 (1929); Ballantine, Sep-
arate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 Calif. L. Rev. 12
(1925); Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 Col. L. Rev.
496 (1912).
3This mystic phrase is found in a multitude of cases. In many instances,
it is used to cover loose reasoning in order to reach a justifiable result. In
most cases, the same result could be reached by the application of more con-
ventional legal doctrines, especially that of agency.
4 The analysis of Douglas and Shanks, cited supra note 2, is outstanding.
For a somewhat different approach, see Powell, also cited supra, note 2. The
cases are collected in 39 A. L. R. 1071, 50 A. L. R. 611, and 102 A. L. R. 1054,
as well as in the discussions cited.
5 Miles v. Bossert (1930), 92 Ind. App. 10, 173 N. E. 656; Scott v. Arm-
strong (1892), 146 U. S. 499; McCagg v. Woodman (1862), 28 Ill. 84-; Re
Thacher (1933), 311 Pa. 278, 166 A. 873; Smith v. Felton (1871), 43 N. Y. 419.
6 Lamb v. Morris (1888), 188 Ind. 179, 20 N. E. 746; Porter v. Rosenman
(1905), 165 Ind. 255, 74 N. E. 1105.
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mutuality should entitle the corporations to set off assets of one against obliga-
tions of the other.7 Where, as in the case at bar, the relationship was not so
close as to render one liable for the debts of the other, there must be a very
strong equity before a setoff will be allowed. Since the subsidiary was estab-
lished for gaining the advantages of the separate entity form of organization,
doubts should be resolved against the corporation when it seeks to disregard
the separate entity concept to gain a benefit peculiar to unified organization.
This is especially true since the benefit of the setoff, if allowed, would be at
the expense of the other depositors and the stockholders of the bank. The
instant case in so holding appears sound, and is in accord with the prevailing
authorities. 8  D. M. C.
INSURANCE-PRESUMPTION OF SuRvvORSHiP.-The decedent, some time be-
fore his death, took out three insurance policies on his life, in each of which,
after naming his wife as beneficiary, he reserved the power of changing the
beneficiary. Each of the policies provided for distribution of the proceeds in
case the beneficiary predeceased the insured. The language whereby this was
accomplished varied. One policy stipulated that the proceeds were "payable
to the beneficiary if surviving the insured, otherwise to the insured's estate."
The other two policies provided, in substance, that if the beneficiary should
have died before the insured, the proceeds should be paid to the estate of the
insured. The insured and the beneficiary were killed in a common disaster,
and no evidence was available to show which survived. The suit here is
between the heirs of the husband and the heirs of the wife to determine who
is entitled to the proceeds of the policies. The court held in favor of the
husband's heirs.1
The court declared that its decision followed the weight of authority on
the three propositions which it enunciated, although this was the first time
the questions had arisen in this jurisdiction.
The first and second propositions may well be treated together: the court
held that where two people die in a common disaster there is no presumption
in favor of either as to survivorship, and that proof of the same must be
furnished by him whose claim is based upon the right of one of the deceased
to inherit from the other, or who would recover in the right of the beneficiary
of the policy. There can be no doubt that the majority of the courts are in
accord with the principal case as to the ability of one of the victims to inherit
from the other,2 but that is of meagre importance here, for this is not an
7 Lucey Mfg. Corp. v. Oil City Iron Works (1930), 15 La. App. 12, 131
So. 57; Piedmont Print Works v. Receivers of Peoples State Bank (1934),
68 F. (2d) 110.
8 General Discount Corp. v. First Nat'l. Bank (1933), 5 F. Supp. 709;
Jewett v. Martinsville Milling Co. (1935), 76 F. (2d), 153; Gallagher v.
Germania Brewing Co. (1893), 53 Minn. 214, 54 N. W. 1115 (dominant
individual stockholder); Erie Bronze Co. v. Haughney (1936), 17 F. Supp.
1022; Taub v. Coker (1931), 162 S. C. 391, 161 S. E. 117; State ex rel.
Sorenson v. Weston Bank (1933), 125 Neb. 612, 251 N. W. 164; Frigidaire
Sales Corp. v. Alexandria Bank and Trust Co. (La. App., 1933), 145 So. 703.
1 McKinney v. Depoy (Ind., 1938), 12 N. E. (2d) 250.
2Young Women's Christian Home v. French (1903), 187 U. S. 401, 23
S. Ct. 184; Russel v. Hallet (1880), 23 Kan. 276; Southwell v. Gray (1901),
72 N. Y. S. 342.
